

Official Transcript

United States of America, The United Kingdom, and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, the Soviet Socialist Republic, against Hermann Wilhelm Goering et al, Defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 11 February 1946, 1400 to 1730 hours, Lord Justice Lawrence presiding.

MAJ. GENERAL ZORYA: Mr. President, following the statement made by the Russian Delegation, I will ask for permission to cross-examine the former Field Marshal of the German Army, Paulus, who will be cross-examined by the Chief Prosecutor of the U.S.S.R., General Rudenko.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well; the witness may be brought in.

(The witness took his place in the box)

BY THE PRESIDENT:

Q Will you please tell me your name?

A Paulus.

Q Will you repeat this oath after me? "I swear by God, the Almighty and Omniscient, that I will speak the pure truth and will withhold and add nothing?"

(The witness repeated the oath)

Would you like to sit down?

BY GENERAL RUDENKO:

Q Your name is Friedrich Paulus?

A Yes.

Q You were born in 1890?

A 1890.

Q You were born in the village of Breitenau, in Kassel?

A Yes.

Q By nationality you are a German?

A Yes.

Q You are a former Field Marshal of the German Army?

A Yes.

Q Your last official position was Commander of the Sixth Army at Leningrad?

A Yes.



..., whether you have given  
the Soviet Socialist Republics?

Q You are confirming such statement.

A Yes, I confirm that.

Q Tell us, please, Witness, what you know regarding the preparation by the German High Command of the armed attack on the Soviet Union.

A From personal experience, I can state the following:

On the 3rd of September, 1940, I took office with the High Command in the General Staff. I was a General Quartermaster and as such I was deputy to the Chief of the General Staff, and in addition carried out the instructions of an operational nature which he delegated to me.

When I took office I found in my sphere of work, or influence, among other things, a still uncompleted operational plan which concerned itself with an attack on the Soviet Union. This operational work or scheme had been carried through by the then General Major, Marx, Chief of the General Staff of the 18th Army, who for this purpose temporarily had been taken over to the Chief of Staff of the Army. The Chief of the Army, Halder, gave the development of this plan into my hands and on the following basis:

There was to be a check of the possibilities of an attack against the Soviet Union, covering the territory, or terrain, the strength of the attack, the manpower to be needed, and so forth. For this purpose there was also mentioned that about 130 to 140 German divisions would be available for this operation. In addition, from the beginning we were to keep in mind taking Roumania into consideration as far as this operation was concerned. The north wing was to include Finland, but this was problematical and was not included in the general plan.

Then, in addition, as a basis for this work which was to be undertaken, the intention of the OKW--the purpose of this operation was to be first the destruction of the Russian Army in the West, Russia, and to prevent them from getting into Russia



As Point 2, the reaching of the Russian  
arm could not effectively attack Germany.

And the last point was the reaching of the line, the Volga-  
Archangelsk.

The working out or preparation which I just outlined was completed at the beginning of November through two attacks with which I was concerned. The officers of the General Staff entrusted with this work, as a basis for the attacks, assumed that to the south one army was to be redeployed from the South of Poland and from Roumania, with the idea of reaching the Dnieper River. To the north of this area there was to be one army group and the strongest around Warsaw; and to the north, to reach Minsk, Smolensk and later to push through to Moscow.

Then there was to be a third army group, the Group North, to be taken from the area of East Prussia to push through the Baltic regions toward Leningrad.

And the conclusions which were taken from these plans was that the Dnieper was to be reached and Smolensk and Leningrad, and then the operation was to be carried on according to developments, and to plan accordingly.

In connection with this, for these undertakings, and for the evaluation of all victories, there were to be several conferences through the General Staff Chief of the Army, that of the Army Groups which had been planned for the East. And further, in connection with this conference, through the Chief of that time, Colonel Kinsel, there was a speech about Russia, describing the geographic and economic situation, about the Red Army, and so forth. And the significant point of this speech was that some preparations for an attack by Russia was not known. With these maneuvers and conferences as I have just described there were theoretical discussions and plans for this offensive and after conclusion of these conferences, the scheme of the attack was considered concluded and ready.



At this time--that is, on 10th of December 1940, the Over-Commander gave our Directive No. 20, and this directive as issued was the basis for all military and economic preparations. And these directions or instructions were to be carried out in such a way that deployment of troops was made ready and developed. These first directives for the deployment of troops in February, 1941, were confirmed by Hitler and they concerned themselves with all these measures and were made known to the troops. Then several supplementary directives were issued.

For the beginning of the attack, the Over-Commander counted on the period of time which would make it possible to carry large movements of troops in Russia, and all preparations were concluded. Then at the end of March Hitler decided to make a change because of his desire to attack Yugoslavia. Then orders as of the 1st of April were set after that time--

THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid you are a little too fast.

THE WITNESS: Where shall I begin?

THE PRESIDENT: I think you better begin where you said that at the end Hitler made a change in the plan.

A (continuing): Because of his decision to attack Yugoslavia, the date for the beginning of the attack had to be changed by about five weeks. That meant postponement to the last half of June. And indeed, this attack actually took place on the 22nd of June, as planned.

Then, in conclusion, I would like to state that the preparations for this attack on the Soviet Union which actually took place on the 22nd of June had been prepared.

Q In what way and under what circumstances--

THE PRESIDENT: One moment. Did the witness give the date? He said that preparations for this attack had been made, and what I want to know is, did he give the date from which it had been prepared?



BY THE PRESIDENT:

Q Did you give the date on which the preparations went forward?

A I am referring to the 3rd of September 1940, when I assumed office, and my observations refer back to that point.

BY GENERAL RUDENKO:

Q In what way and under what circumstances was the participation in the aggression on Soviet Russia ushered in by the participation of Roumania?

A From personal observation, I can say the following:

In about September 1940, at the time in which I was concerned with the operational workings or preparations for the attack on Russia, and from the beginning, the using of Roumania was envisaged for the marching in, that is the right or south wing of the German Army and that was taken into consideration right from the beginning. Then a military mission at that time headed by Cavalry Leader Hansen was sent to Roumania. Then a whole Panzer Division, the Thirteenth, was transferred to Roumania. For those who knew about the future plans it was obvious that this step could only serve to make ready the future partner in the war for the future plans and steps which we had to take now regarding Hungary.

In December 1940, Colonel Laslow came to the High Command of the Army at Zossen, to the headquarters of the Chief of the Hungarian Operational Group. He asked for a conference regarding questions of organization.

The Hungarian Army at that time was concerned with the question of changing over its units into divisions and also with the setting up of motorized groups such as Panzer Groups. The chief of the Organization and myself advised Colonel Laslow at the same time because several Hungarian commissions were in Berlin. The Hungarian Minister of War was also present at the same time, and we discussed the exchange of supplies or the sending of supplies--German supplies--to Hungary.



were concerned with future plans that all these measures with regard to supplying arms to other armies was only possible at that time when these armies could be used for war, for Germany.

Regarding Hungary, there is a further point I should like to mention: With the development of events in Yugoslavia, Hitler at the end of March, 1941, decided to attack Yugoslavia. On the 27th or 28th of March I was called to the Reichschancellery in Berlin where at that time there was going on a conference between Hitler, Keitel and Jodl and on which the Chief of the Army had been active. This conference had just been concluded. When I arrived I was advised by the General Staff of the Army, General Halder, that Hitler had decided to attack Yugoslavia and for once to eliminate a flanking movement from the direction of Greece, because there was a rail line leading to the South, and to get this rail line, and then also for the future--for the case "Barbarossa" to keep the right flank clear for this plan, for the carrying out of this plan.

I was charged with the mission and received the required number of officers to go to Vienna to give certain orders to the appropriate officers and then after that to travel on to Budapest to the Hungarian General Staff and to carry out the same mission there and to agree with them on the deployment of German troops in Austrian territory and the participating of Hungarian troops in the attack against Yugoslavia.

On the 30th of March, early in the morning, I arrived in Budapest and had a conference with General Wertz, then with the Chief of the Operational Group of the Hungarian General Staff, Colonel Laslow. These conferences went along in good order and ended very quickly and the desired result was achieved. The result was then written down on a card, and on the card that I received from the General Staff of Hungary was contained the deployment against Yugoslavia, the deployment



of Yugoslavia as envisaged, also the manpower in the Carpathian sector was discussed. This was to protect the rear against the Soviet Union and the fact was a sign that even on the side of Hungary the realization was that an attack by Germany against Yugoslavia would be considered as an aggressive action by the Soviet Union.

As a matter of principle, principally, the taking in of Hungary into the preparation of these plans and later on into the carrying out of these plans as far as that is concerned at that time I received the attitude of Hitler and it was as follows:

Hitler thought that Hungary was anxious, through German help, to recapture the areas which she had lost in the First World War. And in addition, they were afraid that Roumania, which was an Ally of Germany and might push them into the back ground. As far as this attitude was concerned, Hitler thought Hungary in line with his ideas. But he was, as we could see from various examples, very cautious toward Hungary, and for two reasons: For one, he did not believe Hungary; and secondly, he did not want to make Hungary too many promises at too early a stage, and I can cite one example: The question of the oil regions. Later when the attack was begun that is the attack against Russia, the Seventeenth Army which was fighting at that point had the emphatic order at all costs to take this before the arrival of the Hungarians.

Regarding this future partner, according to my observation, the strategy of Hitler was such that as far as certain participation was concerned he counted on it and sent armaments and help but he was not certain when he went to make all his plans and did not set a certain time when to initiate Hungary into his plans.



Then we came to the Finnish question. In December, 1940, the first visit of the Finnish General Staff Chief took place at Zossen. General Heinrichs had a conference with the General Chief of the Army, but I can't remember the contents of the speech out of this conference. But he did make a speech about the Finno-Russian War of 1939-1940. He gave this speech before the officers of the General Staff of the Army and told his officers who were present at the time -- that is in connection with the discussion of the Eastern plans -- this speech before these officers had quite a significance at that time, because it coincided in time with the directive issued in December.

This speech was significant in that battle experiences with the Red Army were made clear and a judgment of the Finnish troops -- that is, for future plans by the Germans-- could be made known.

Then there was a second visit of this Finnish General Staff Chief. That was at Zossen at the headquarters, and it was perhaps in the second half of March, 1941. The Chief of Staff of Finland arrived from Salzburg where he had had conferences with the High Command of the Wehrmacht. The contents of these conferences with the Chief of Staff was the cooperation of the Southern Finnish Manpower with the Operation Barbarossa, and working together with the Army Group North which was to come from East Prussia towards Leningrad. At that time the agreement was reached that the Finnish troops were to be determined according to the pushing forward of the German Army Group North and the later command pushing forward towards Leningrad. That was to depend on later agreements according to the development of events.

Those are the personal observations which I myself made in the beginning, and the drawing together of the analysis into a common action.



Q In what way was the attack on the USSR carried out by the German troops under the High Command?

A Will you please repeat the question. I did not quite get it.

Q How, and under what circumstances, was the armed attack on the USSR carried out. The attack which was prepared by the Hitlerite government and the High Command of the German Army?

A The attack on Russia took place as I described, after a plan which had been prepared much in advance and had been prepared very carefully. The troops involved in this attack had been assembled, and only on special instructions were they taken group by group into the line of future deployment and then, on this whole long front, from Rumania to Eastern Prussia, they were to be ready. Of course, Finland was excluded from this.

The troops were assembled along this front for a simultaneous attack, and the operational plan on a large scale, as I described in the beginning, was tried out mentally, so to speak. Then, the deployment and marching up of troops in detail, in groups, corps, divisions, was discussed in detail and was put in order in the smallest detail, much before the beginning of the war. Everything was ready.

A deceptive measure was directed and organized from Norway and the coast of France. The purpose of a landing in England in June 1941 was to be pretended, and attention was to be diverted from the East through this pretense. Not only the operational carrying out, but the tactical surprise was planned well in advance. For instance, the prohibition of the boundaries before the beginning of the war meant possible losses and the loss was to be a sacrifice for the element of surprise. On the other hand, the element of surprise across the boundary from the enemy was not expected.

All of these measures showed that a criminal attack was underfoot.



Q In what way did you determine the aims which were pursued by Germany in attacking Soviet Russia?

A The purpose of attacking the Volga Line, which was far beyond German strength, is characteristic of the boundless ambition of Hitler and of the nationalist regime. As far as strategy is concerned, the reaching of these aim would have been the destruction of the manpower of the Soviet Union, the fighting forces of the Soviet Union. With the winning of this line there would have been conquered the chief areas of Soviet Russia, with the capital Moscow, and the political and economic center, the focal point of the Soviet Union.

Economically, the reaching of this line would have been significant. It would have meant the possession of the most important nutritional areas, the most important natural resources, including the oil wells of the Caucasus and the main centers of production of Russia, and also the communications not of Russia, that is, European Russia.

Hitler was very strong on the winning of economic aims in this war. Just how strongly he felt on this point I can cite through a personal example that I describe. In June of 1943, the first of June, at a conference regarding the army group south in Poltava, Hitler declared:

"If I do not get the oil of Maikob and Prosnia, then I must quit this war.

For the spoliation and the administration of the areas which were to be conquered, economic and administrative organs had been envisaged before the beginning of the war, and everything had been placed in readiness.

Then, in conclusion, as a comprehensive remark, I would like to state that the aims as mentioned meant the conquering, for the purpose of colonization, of Russian areas and territories, and through their use and spoliation, and through



the means gained therefrom, the war in the West was to be concluded with the setting up of German domination of Europe.

Q And the last question: Whom do you consider as guilty of the initiation of the criminal war against Soviet Russia?

A May I please have the question repeated?

GENERAL RUDENKO: May I repeat the question?

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal is about to address an observation to General Rudenko. The Tribunal thinks that a question such as you have just put, as to who was guilty for the aggression upon Soviet territory, is one of the main questions which the Tribunal has to decide, and therefore is not a question upon which the witness ought to give his opinion.

Is that what counsel for the defense wish to object to?

DR. LATERNER (Counsel for the General Staff): Yes, Mr. President, that was to be the observation.

GENERAL RUDENKO:

Q Then perhaps the Tribunal will permit me to put this question in another way.

Who of the defendants was an active participant in the initiation of war against the Soviet Union?

A As far as the defendants are concerned, I would say the most important military advisers to Hitler. That would be Chief of Staff Keitel, Chief of the Operational Branch Jodl, and Goering, in his duty as Reichsmarshal, as Commander of the Air Forces, and as Plenipotentiary for Armament Measures.

Q In conclusion, I will summarize what I concluded from your testimony, that long before the 22nd of June the Hitlerite Government and the High Command were planning an aggressive war against the Soviet Union for the purpose of colonizing the territory of the Soviet Union.



A I have no doubt of that according to the developments as I pictured them, and also in connection with all the directives as they were contained in the well-known Green file.

GENERAL RUDENKO: I have no more questions, Mr. President.



**C E R T I F I C A T E**

12 January 1948

I, Yale Maxon who am the chief of the I.P.S. Document Division hereby certify that I.P.S. Doc. 3332 attached hereto is an accurate copy of pages 4243-4252 inclusive of the official transcript of proceedings of the Nuremberg International Tribunal for 11 February 1946 which is now in the custody of the I.P.S. Document Division.

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Yale Maxon,  
Chief, Document Division  
I.P.S.



1 P.S. Dec No 3332

Exhibit 110.

「アメリカ合衆國、フランス共和國、大英及北部アイルランド聯合王國  
及ソビエト社會主義共和國聯邦對ハーマン・ウィルヘルム・ゲーリング  
／HERMANN WILHELM GOERING／其他被告國々一九四六年  
十月十日午後二時ヨリ全五時ヨリ至ルマデローレンス判事／LORD  
JUSTICE LAWRENCE／裁判長トス・猪逸ニ入ル／NURENBERG／  
ニ開廷ス。國際軍事裁判所、公式字本」

ゾーリヤ少將／MAJ. GENERAL ZORYA／

「裁判長殿、ロシヤ代表團ヨリ申スニ、統テ余ハ元ドイツ陸軍元帥  
／PAULS／、審問、即許可ヲ願ヒマス。審問ハ、聯王檢察官  
グレン將軍／CHIEF PROSECUTOR OF THE U.S.S.R., GENERAL RUDENKO  
／カ行ヒマス。」

裁判長

「ヨロシイ。證人ヲ通シテ下ア。」

(證人、證人席ニ着席ス)

裁判長ヨリ

問 貴下、名前ヲ言フテ下ア。

答 バウス／PAULS／下ア。

問 私、後カ、此、宣誓言フ録取シテ下ア。

「全能全智、神ニ對シ、自分カ混リ氣ナキ眞實ヲ語リ、且  
何事モ隱シ又附加見コトヲ誓フ。」

(證人、宣誓ス)

着席シテ下ア。」



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A-

答 個人の経験 ムリとて、次に二つ申す上へ、そのかゝる事。



「一九四〇年九月三日私に参謀本部 / GENERAL STAFF / 内  
統帥部 / HIGH COMMAND / に勤務シシタ。私に主計總  
監 / GENERAL QUARTER MASTER / 其ノ資格ヲ参謀  
總長ノ副官アリ。且ツ其ノ上級ノ私ニ委任シテ、作戰上ノ全  
令ヲ遂行シシタ

私ノ就任シシタ時、私ノ仕事ニ或ハ権限ノ範圍内ニモト  
シテ他ノ事ト一緒ニ聯攻要ノ關係ニ未完成ノ作戰計畫ヲ  
ハツテ知リシタ。此ノ作戰ニ關スル仕事、或ハ企画ハ當時ヲ將ノ  
第十八軍參謀總長マルクス / MARX, CHIEF OF THE GENE-  
RAL STAFF OF THE 18TH ARMY / ニ任テ行ハレタマヘタリ。  
此ノ人ハ其目的ノ為メ時陸軍參謀總長ノ許ハ引取レテオツ  
クマレタリマス。陸軍長官ハグラー / THE CHIEF OF THE  
ARMY, HALDER / 此ノ計畫ニ否成テ私ノ手ニ委任、其ノ基  
礎條件ハ次ノ如キモノニテアリシタ。

領域或ハ地域ノ攻取ノ軍勢ノ所要人カ等全般ニ亘リソ聯  
攻要ノ成否ヲ検討シテ見テハナラナリ。此ノタメ又此ノ作戰用  
トシテ百三千乃至百四十個師團ヲ用ルニモ未ダ未ト言ハテ  
ナシタ。之ニ加ヘ此ノ作戰ニ關スル限り、最初ヨリハソ聯ヲ考慮  
ニ入レルコトヲ留意セヌハナラナリトシテナシタ。右點ハソ聯ヲ  
ニトテ合ムコトヲナラナシタカニソ聯ノ問題ナラ、一般計畫ニ  
ノミナシタ。

ソレカハ更ニ、ソレカラス此ノ仕事ノ基礎條件トシテ統帥  
部 / O. K. W. / 一意思圖アリマシタ。即チ此ノ作戰目的ハ



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ソシテ此等ノ計画カラ得ラレタ結論ハ、ドニエール河/ THE DNIAPER /  
ニ到達シ、次ニスモレンスク/ SMOLYENSK / レニングラード/ LENINGRAD / へ行  
キ、ソレヨリ作戰ハ戰況ニ從ツテ續行サレ、又其ノヤウ計画ヲスルコトニ  
ナツテナマシタ。

之ニ關聯シテ、此等仕事タメ及ビ戰果ヲ確認スルタメ陸軍  
參謀總長・東部ニ當テラレテナタ軍集團ノ參謀總長ニヨル數  
次ノ會議ガアルコトナツテナマシタ。更ニ此ノ會議ニ關聯シ、當時ノ  
長官・キンゼル大佐/ COLONEL KINSEL / ニヨリ、ロシヤニ關シ、ソノ地  
理的・經濟的情勢ヲ説明シ、又赤軍ノコトヤ其他ニ關シテノ演説  
ガアリマシタ。而シテ此ノ演説ノ大要ハロシヤ側ノ戰爭準備ニ  
不明モカアツタコトデアリマス。此等私ガ只今説明シマシタ運用及  
會議ヨリ、此ノ攻撃ニ對スル理論的討議及計画ガアリ、此等會議  
終了後、攻撃ノ計画ハ終リ、準備ナツタモノト考ヘラレマシタ。

此ノ時、即チ一九四〇年十月十日、總司令官ガ我ガ命令オノヲ出  
シマシタ。此ノ出サレタ命令ハ凡ソル軍事・經濟的準備基礎ト  
ナリマシタ。而シテ此等命令及指示ハ軍ノ展開ガ準備サレ、促進  
サレルヤウニ遂行サレルコトナツテナタリデアリマス。一九四一年二月ノ  
軍ノ展開ニ對スル最初ノ命令ガヒットラーニヨリ確認サレ、コレ等ハ  
皆此等方策ニ關スルモノテ、全軍ニ布告サレマシタ。ソレカラ數個ノ  
補足命令ガ発セラレマシタ。

攻撃ヲ開始スルタメニ、總司令官ハロシヤ内ニ軍ノ大行動ヲ  
行フニ充分ノ期間ヲ要求シ、總司令官ノ準備ハ成ヲタリデアリマス。  
ソレカラ三月ノ終リニヒットラーハニーフォースヲヴィアヲ攻撃セント希  
望ノタメニ、変更ヲ決定シマシタ。ソレカラ四月一日現在ノ命令ハ其後



定まらマシタ。

裁判長

貴下ハ少し早過ギルト思ヒマス。

証人

何處カラ始メマセウカ？

裁判長

貴下が最後ニツテヒトラが計画ヲ変更シタト

言ツタトコロカラ、始メテモラウトヨイト思ヒマス。

答(續イテ)

ユウゴウスラウアラ攻撃セントノ決心ノタメ、攻撃開始

ノ日ヲ約五週間変更セネバナリマセンデシタ。ソレハ六月ノ後半迄延

期スルコトヲ意味シマシタ。ソシテ事實、此ノ攻撃ハ計画通り六

月廿二日ニ行ハレマシタ。

ソレカラ結論トシテ、私ハ六月廿二日實際行ハレタソノ攻撃ノ比、

準備ハ出来上ツテキタコトヲ申上ゲ度イデアリマス。

問

如何ナル風ニ又如何ナル情勢下ニテスカ？

裁判長

一寸待ツテ下サイ。証人ハ日取ヲ言ヒマシタカ？

証人ハ此ノ攻撃ノ準備ハ出来上ツテキタト言ヒマシタ。ソレデ私ノ知

リ度イコトハ証人ハ其ノ準備が行ハレタ日ヲ言ツタカトイフストデス。

裁判長ヨリ

問

準備が始マツタ日ヲ言ヒマシタカ？

答

私ハ一九四〇年九月三日、私が就任シタ時ノコトヲ申上ゲテ

オリマス。ソシテ私ノ觀察ハ其ノ時マテ遡ツテ关联シテキマス。

ルテニ將軍/GENERAL RUDENKOヨリ

問

如何ナル風ニ又如何ナル情勢下ニ、ソガイエツトコシヤ攻

撃ヘノ参加カルマニアノ参加ニヨツテ始メラレマシタカ？

答

私、個人的經驗ヨリシテ次ノコトが申上ゲラレマス。

一九四〇年九月頃、即チ私カロシア攻撃ノ作戰計画



準備ニ関係シタ時、ソレカラ最初カラルマアヲ使ソテ進軍即テ  
 獨ニ軍ノ右翼或ハ南部ヲ進軍サスコトガ考慮セラレ、コレハ最初  
 ヨリ考慮サニテオツクモノデアリマス。ソレカラ當時騎兵隊長ハン  
 セン/HANSEN/ヲ主席トスル軍事使節カールマニアニ派遣サレマシタ  
 。ソレカラオナニ戦車師團ガ全部ルマニアニ移サレマシタ。將來ノ  
 計画ニツキ知ル者ニトワテハ、此ノ措置ハ戦争ノ將來ノ提携者ヲ  
 將來ノ計画並ビニ我々が今ヤハンガリーニ對シ取ラナケレバナラナカ  
 タ処置ニ對シ準備スルニ役立ツ以外、モノデナイコトハ明カデアリマシタ。  
 一九四〇年十二月ラズロー大佐/Colonel Laslovi/ハツォーセン/  
 Zossen/ニアル陸軍司令部・ハンガリーヤ作戦團長ノ司令部ヘ来  
 マシタ。彼ハ組織ノ問題ニ関シ會議ノ召集ヲ要求シマシタ。  
 當時、ハンガリー軍ハ其ノ單位ヲ師團ニ變更シ、又迅速戦車部  
 隊ノ如キ機動部隊ノ設置ニ苦心シテ居マシタ。ソノ部隊ノ司令官  
 ト私トハ同時ニラズロー大佐/Colonel Laslovi/ニ知ラセマシタ。数人  
 ノハンガリー委員ガベルリンニキタカラデス。同時ニハンガリー陸軍大臣  
 モ出席シ、我々ハ物資ノ交換、物資ノ即チ獨乙ノ物資ノハンガ  
 リ輸送ニツキ討議シマシタ。

將來ノ計画ニ關係アル我々皆ニハ武器ヲ他ノ軍隊ニ供給スルコト  
 ニ關スル此等処置ハ當時ソノ軍隊ガ戦争ノタメ即チ獨乙ノタメ用  
 ヒラシモノナル時ニ限り出来ルコトデアルコトハ明カデアリマシタ。

ハンガリーニ關シテハ、私ヲ申上テ度イ矣カモウ一ツアリマス。ユー  
 ゴスラヴィアニ於ケル事態ノ發展ニヨリ、ヒットラーハ一九四二年三  
 月末ユゴスラヴィア攻撃ヲ決定シマシタ。三月二十七日及二十八  
 日私ハベルリンノ總統官邸ニ呼バレマシタ。此處デハヒットラー/HITLER/



カイテル/KEITEL/ヨーゼフ/JOEL/ノ間ニ会議が行ハレテオリ、此ノ会議ニ陸軍司令長官が非常ニ積極的デアリマシタ。此ノ会議が丁度終ワタトコロデシタ。

私が其處へ着イタ時、私ハ陸軍參謀總長ハルダー將軍、GENERAL HALDER/カラ、ヒットラーがユーゴスラヴィアヲ攻撃シ、斯乎ギリシャ方面ヨリ側面運動ヲ排除スルニ決定シタ。其ノ理由ハ其処ニ南方ヘ行ク鐵道ガリ、此ノ鐵道ヲ取り、ソレカラ將來ノタメニ「ヨバルバンサ」/"BARBAROSSA"/ノ件ノタメニ、此ノ計画ノタメニ此ノ計画遂行ノタメニ右翼ヲ心配ナキモノトスルタメデアルト聞カサレマシタ。

私ハ此ノ使命ヲ課セラレ、必要數ノ將校ヲ受取りマシタ。コレハウーンヘ行キ關係將校ニ或ル命令ヲ與ヘ、ソレカラ更ニブダペスト/BUDAPEST/ヘ行キハンガリー參謀本部ヲ訪ネ、此処デ同様使命ヲ果シ、オーストリア領内ノ獨乙軍展開及ビハンガリー軍ノユーゴスラヴィア攻撃ヲ參照ニ関シ、彼等ト協定スルタメデアリマシタ。

三月廿日、早朝、私ハブダペスト/BUDAPEST/ニ到着シマシタ。ソレデゾルト將軍/GENERAL WERT/トシカラハンガリー參謀本部作戰團長ラズロー/LASLOV/大佐ト會議シマシタ。此等會議ハ順序正シク進行シ非常ニ早ク終了シ、所期ノ結果が達成サレマシタ。



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ソコ其ノ結果ヲカードノ上ニ書キミタ。ソニテ私がハンガリー參謀本部ヨリ受取ッタカードニハンゴースラヴイアニ對スル展開考ヘラレテナルニゴースラヴイアノ展開ヲ載セラレテ有ミタ。ソニテ又カルパチヤ / CALPATHIAN / 方面ノ人的資源ガ論ジラレテ有ミタ。此ハソ聯ニ對シ脅後ヲ守ルタメデアリミタ。此事實ハ獨ヒハンゴースラヴイア攻撃ヲソ聯ハ侵畧行爲ナリト看做スゲラントハンガリー側デモ考ヘタ証據デアリミタ。大體原則トシテハンガリーヲ此等計畧ノ中ニ加ヘ又後ニ此等計畧ニ實行ニ加ヘルヲ此ニ關スル範圍デ當時私ハヒトラノ態度ヲ同キミタガ、ソハ次如クデミタ。

ヒトラハハンガリーガ獨ヒ、援助ニヨツテ第二次歐洲大戰デ大ツタ地域ヲ取戻シタガツテナルモト考ヘミタ。ソニテ其ノ上彼等ハヒトラガ獨ヒ、同盟國ヲ自分達ヲカニ押込ニテ終ツカズ知ナイト配ニテキミタ。此態度ニ關スル限リデハヒトラハハンガリーガ彼、考ヘト一致スルト考ヘテ有ミタ。然シ彼ハ色々ナ例カラ判ルヤウニハンガリーニ對シ非常ニ慎重デ、ソハヒトラノ理由ガアリミタ。第一ニヒトラハハンガリーヲ信用シマデミタ。第二ニ彼ハ余リ早期ニハンガリーニ余リマウ、約束ヲスルニヒトラ望ミマデミタ。ヒトラノ例ヲ與テルコトガ出来ヌ。油田地方問題デ、後ニ至リ攻撃、即チロニア攻撃ガ開始セラレタ時、其地突デ闚ツテ有ミタ第十七軍ハ凡ニ犠牲ヲ拂ツテモハンガリー軍ノ到達前ニコソ取ルト、強イ命令ヲ受ケミタ。



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此、將來、仲向ニツイテハ、私、觀察スルトハロテハ、ロット  
ノ戦畧ハ、或ル程度、参加ニツイテキル。彼ハ、ソレヲ予期シ、  
武器ヲ援助ヲ送ツクガ、彼が總テ、計畫ヲ作ツテ行ク時  
ニ、確信ナク、何時ニガリテ目今、計畫、中ニ入レルベキカ  
時ヲ定メテカツタヤウナ程度、モデアリミタ。

ソカラ、フィンランド問題ニ入りコス。一九四〇年十二月ソオース  
ノッセン / NOSSEN / ニ於テフィンランド參謀總長、最初、訪問ガアリミ  
タ。ハイリッヒ / HEINRICHS / 將軍ガ、陸軍總長ト會  
議シミタガ、此、會議カラ、其ノ講演、内容ハ思ハスルコトガ  
出来マセン。然シ彼ガ一九三九—一九四〇年、芬蘇戰ニキ  
講演ヲミタコトハ確カデス。彼ハ陸軍參謀本部、將  
校、前デ此、講演ヲミ其、時其意趣ニ居テ、將校達ニ語  
リミタ。——即チ東部作戰ニ同連ニテ——此等將校  
ノ前デシタ此、講演當時相当ノ意義ガアリミタ。トイフ  
ハ十二月ニ出タ命令ト時ガ一致シテヤタカラデス。

此、講演ハ赤軍ト、戰鬪經驗ガ明クトナリ、芬蘭軍  
ノ判斷——即チ獨リ、將來、計畫ニ對スル——ガ明クト  
ナツタ矣デ意義ガアツタデアリス。

ソカラ、芬蘭參謀總長、第二回自、訪問ガアリミタ。  
ソハソオース / NOSSEN / ニ於ケル司令部ニ於テアリミタ  
多分一九四一年三月、後半ノコトデアリミタ。

芬蘭參謀總長、獨リ軍統帥部ト會議ヲミタ  
ザルツブルグ / ZARITSBURG / カラヤツタネミタ。參謀長ト  
此等會議、内容ハ南部芬蘭兵カトバルボツサ



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BARBAROSSA 作戰部隊ト、協カト東プロシアカラ  
レニングラード / LENINGRAD / ニモルコトニツテ平々陸軍一部  
集團トハ協カトアリシモ。當時吾國軍ハ獨ニ陸  
軍一部集團ノ前進及ビ、部隊ガレニングラード /  
LENINGRAD / へ前進スルニ從テ決マレルコトニツテ平々シク。  
ソノ事態ノ發展ニ應ジテ後デスル協定ニヨルコトデシク。

此等ガ最初私ガシク。個人的ニ觀察デアリ。分析ヲ  
協共ニ致、行動ニ集中スルコトデアリマス。

向 統帥部、下ニ獨ニ軍ハ、聯攻撃ヲ如何ニル風ニ  
行ヒシタカ?

答 ン、復向ラモウ一度言ツテ下サス。コト判リマシタシク。

向 如何ニ情勢、下ニソ、聯、武力攻撃即チソトニ  
政府及獨逸軍統帥部ニヨリ準備サシタ此攻撃ガ行  
ハシタカ?

答 ン、聯攻撃ハ私が申エゲマシク如ク。相当前ニ非常ニ  
慎重ニ準備サレタ計取ラ以テ行ハシタシク。此攻撃ニ  
關係アル軍隊ガ集結サレタシク。ソニテ、特別命令ニツテ  
一集團毎ニ將來展開スル線ニ持ッテ行ハシタシク。ソニテ  
此、ルニニアカラ東プロシアニ至ル長々全戦線ニ於テ停機ニ  
ナルコトニサシタ平々シク。勿論吾國ニシカラ除外サシタ平  
シク。

此軍隊ハ一齊攻撃、タタ、戦線ニ集結サレ、ソニテ  
私が最初申エゲマシク如ク。大規模ノ作戰計画ガ言ハ  
ベ頭、中ニ試験サレシタシク。ソカラ、戦争、始マルニ前

軍隊、詳ニ、集団、隊、師団、展開、進軍が詳細ニ  
亘リテ討議セシ非常ニ細カク整理サレタ。万事準備ハ  
出来テヤラハデアリヌ。

諾威ヨリ仏海岸ニ至ル陽動作戦ヲ命令サレ組織  
ミタ。一九四一年六月英國上陸、目的ヲ蒙ラコトデアリ。此  
伴装ニヨリ、注意ヲ東部ヨリソラセルコトニナツテヤリヌ。  
作戦、実行、ミナズ、戦術上、奇襲ニ、充分事前ニ計  
画サレタ。例ヘバ戦争前ニ境界線ヲ越エルコトハ損  
害ニナル可能性ヲ意味ミテヤリヌ。ソニテ此、損害ハ奇襲  
要素保持、犠牲トナルコトニナツテヤラゲアル。一方敵ヨリ  
スル国境線突破、奇襲要素ハナクテヤル。

此等策ハ總テ不法ヲ攻撃ガ進捗ニツキツコトヲ示  
スデアリス。

問、獨逸ガソヴィエトロシアヲ攻撃スルタメニ從ツテ来タ  
意圖ヲ如何ナルオズテ見定メミタカ？

答、獨逸、実カ達カニ越エルヴォルガ/VOLGA/線ヲ攻  
撃、目的ハソヴィエト及國家主義政府、限無キ野望  
ノ表徴デアリス。戦術ニ関スル限リテハ、此等目的、達  
成ハソヴィエトロシア、人カ即チソ、聯、恐ルベキ軍隊、破  
壊デアツタデス。此線ヲ達成スルベ、首都デアルモスコ  
/MOSCOW/ソビエト政治的、経済的、中心、聯、集、兵、舎  
ハソヴィエトロシア、主地域ヲ征服ミタコトニナツタデヤ。

経済的ニテ、此線ニ到達スルコトハ有意義ダツタデヤ。  
此ハ最モ重要ナ食料供給地域、最モ重要ナ天然資



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源デニコカス、油井、ロニヤ生産、中心地及ニコニヤ即チ、  
ロバ、ロニヤ、交通網ヲ含ムコトヲ握ルコトヲ意味ニテモシタ。  
ニトラーハ此、戦争ノ経済的目的ヲ達スルコトニ非常ニ  
強硬デシタ。ニトラーハ此、突ニツキ如何ニ強硬デアリタ  
ハ、私、申上テル個人的ノ例ヲ擧ゲルコトガ出来ヌ。  
一九四三年六月、即チ六月一日、ボルタワ/POLTAWA/ニ於テ  
ル陸軍南方集團ニ同スル會議ニ於テ、ニトラーハ次、如ク  
申シシタ。

『若シ余ガマイコフ/МАЙКОФ/及プロスニア/ПРОСНИЯ/  
ノ油ヲ得ルコトガ出来ナケレバ、此、戦争ハ止メナケレバ、ナ  
征服スベキ地域、掠奪及行政、タ、戦前、経済行  
政、機關ガ考ヘラレタリ、万事停機、安勢ニアリシタ。  
シカラテ結論ノ包括的評言トシテ、私ハ以上ノ目的ハ征  
服ヲ意味シロニヤ、地域及領土ヲ植民ニスルタデアリ、又此等  
ヲ利用、掠奪スルコトヨリ、又シカラテ得ラルガ法ニヨリ、西部ニ於  
テ戦争ガ獨シ、ヨーロッパ支配確立ヲ以テ終結サレルコトニシテ  
ナク、コトヲ申シテ度イデアリヌ。

問、シカラテ最後、質問デス。貴下ハソヴイェットロニヤニ對  
スル非合法戦争ヲ始メタ罪ハ誰ニアルト考ヘヌカ?

答、モウ一度質問ヲ繰返シテ戴クタイデスガ?

ルデニコ/RUDENKO/將軍、モウ一度質問ヲ繰返シテ  
ウカ?

裁判長、當法廷ガルデニコ/RUDENKO/將軍ニ注  
意ヲ申シテアウトシテキルトコロデス。貴下ガ只今尋ネラタ

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ソヴィエト領土侵襲、罪に誰ニアリカ、如キ問題ハ、当三  
廷が決定スベキ主権問題、ソヴィエト從ッテ証人が其ノ  
意見を述べル可キ問題デハ、ソヴィエト當三廷に考ヘマス。

此が被告辯護人側が要議ヲ申立テ、ナルコトデスカ?

ラテルニヤ / LATERNIER / 博エ (参謀總長辯護人)  
ソウデス。裁判長殿。ソレガソノ注意、デアリマシウ。  
ルデニ / RUDENKO / 將軍ヨリ。

デハ、多分三廷に、私が此、質問ヲ違ッテ風ニスルハ許シテ  
戴テルデス。

ソ聯ニ対スル戦争開始ニ積極的ニ参加シタ人ハ被告、  
中、誰デスカ?

答。被告三國スル限リデハ、ソヴィエト、最モ重要ナ戦争  
顧問ト申上ゲマス。ソレハ参謀長カイテル / KAITER / 作戰  
部長ヨードル / YODER / 及ビ獨逸國家元帥、空軍司令  
官、軍備政策全權トシテ、職務ニアルゲーリング / GOERING /  
デス。

問。結論トシテ、私ハ貴下、証言ヨリ帰結シタコトヲ事  
約スレバ、六月二十二日迄カ以前ニソヴィエト政府ト統帥部ト  
ソ聯領土ヲ植民化スル目的ヲ以テ、ソ聯侵襲、戦争ヲ  
計画シ、アッタコトナリマスネ。

答。私が如何ク發展ト有名ナ青色ニアイルニ合ヒテ、年  
ル總テ、命令ニ因リテ、私ハソレニ何等、疑モハサシマス。

ルデニ / RUDENKO / 將軍

裁判長殿モウ質問ニアリマス。

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證 明 書

一九四八年一月十二日

Doc. 3332.

余、國際檢察團文書課長「エール、メークソン」ハ茲ニ別添國際檢察團文書第三三三二號ガ目下國際檢察團文書課ニ保管中ナル一九四六年二月十一日ノ「ニュンベルグ」國際軍事裁判所裁判ノ公式報告ニ含マレテ居ル第四二四三―四二五二頁ノ正確ナル寫ナルコトヲ證明スル。

國際檢察團文書課長 「エール、メークソン」

Cert.